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Introduction 
About twenty years ago, it was discovered that placental cell free DNA can be detected in the 
blood of pregnant women. Following this discovery, it is now possible to use a simple blood 
test―so-called ‘non-invasive prenatal testing’ (NIPT)―to ascertain, at a relatively early 
stage of a pregnancy, genetic information about both the woman and the fetus. On the face of 
it, NIPT represents a significant addition to the reproductive options that are available to 
women (and their partners).
1
 However, the question raised by the development of NIPT is not 
whether it is legitimate for women to make their own (informed) reproductive choices, but 
whether (or which of) the choices now facilitated by NIPT are ‘legitimate’ ones for women to 
have.
2
 
In this article, our first, and principal, purpose is to review the Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ 
(NCOB’s) report on Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing: Ethical Issues (the Report)3, a report that 
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takes a relatively conservative position in relation to the permissible uses of NIPT. Secondly, 
we introduce two more general questions provoked by the Report, one concerning the nature 
and extent of the informational interests that are to be recognised in today’s ‘information 
societies’ and the other concerning the membership of today’s ‘genetic societies’. Thirdly, at 
a time when the NCOB is undergoing a process of ‘renewal’, we ask what kind of bioethics 
body the Council is and aspires to be.  
Our central criticism of the Report is that, while it lays out very clearly a range of competing 
individual and collective interests that might bear on one’s view as to which uses of NIPT are 
legitimate, it misses the opportunity to put these interests into an order of importance that 
would explain and justify why the Council takes the particular view that it does. In the light 
of this criticism, we suggest that the Council should develop such an order of importance 
(and we sketch how this might be done); or, failing that, we argue that the Council should 
present its reflections in a way that engages public debate around a number of options rather 
than making firm recommendations.   
We start by sketching the context in which the NCOB has undertaken its work on NIPT. 
Then, we turn to the Report, focusing on its ethical framework, its recommendations, and its 
effective implementation. This leads to the two more general questions prompted by the 
Report. Finally, we consider the methodology and role of the NCOB. We suggest that at 
every level―for pregnant women, for communities, for the NCOB, and for regulators―there 
are challenging times ahead. 
The Context for the Report 
Early in 2016, following a successful trial led by Professor Lyn Chitty at Great Ormond 
Street Hospital,
4
 the UK National Screening Committee announced that it would recommend 
the cautious piloting of NIPT within the existing screening programme for Down syndrome.
5
 
Stated simply, pregnant women will be initially screened using the so-called combined test
6
; 
then, those who are identified as being significantly at risk will be offered NIPT. While 
women who have a negative NIPT result can avoid the more invasive tests for Down 
syndrome (namely, amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling), those women with a positive 
NIPT result will be advised to have one of these tests. If NIPT lives up to its promise, 
reducing the number of more invasive tests and, concomitantly, the number of babies lost 
during pregnancy, its advocates will wonder what there is not to like about this new option. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/NIPT-background-paper-8-Nov-2015-FINAL.pdf (last 
accessed April 27, 2016). 
 
4
  http://www.rapid.nhs.uk/about-rapid/evaluation-study-nipt-for-down-syndrome/. 
 
5
  See J. Gallagher, ‘Safer Down’s test backed for NHS use’ (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-
35311578). 
6
  This test combines information from a serum screen with a measurement from an ultrasound scan of 
the nuchal fold on the back of the neck of the fetus. 
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Nevertheless, some will oppose NIPT because they see it as exacerbating existing concerns 
about the ‘medicalisation’ of pregnancy, the ‘commodification’ of life, the ‘trivialisation’ of 
decisions about abortion, the ‘routinisation’ of prenatal testing, and the ‘stigmatisation of 
disability’, and so on.7 In addition to such concerns, however, there is a new anxiety that 
stems from the potential use of NIPT to provide information about the fetus that goes beyond 
Down syndrome and the other trisomies,
8
 even to the point of full genomic profiling, as well 
as returning information about the mother.
9
 There are also some questions about the 
accuracy, reliability, and interpretability of the test. While NIPT is extremely reliable in 
relation to Down syndrome, it is a bit less reliable in relation to Edwards’ and Patau’s 
syndromes;
10
 and, in the case of some chromosomal microdeletions (missing genetic 
information) and microduplications (additional duplicated genetic information), the results 
may be equivocal and hard to interpret.  
If NIPT were to be available only within the NHS, regulators might be reasonably confident 
that they could control its availability and application. However, private sector providers of 
the test already offer a range of information which, in our connected on-line environments, is 
only an email away. Accordingly, in practice, there are reasons to doubt the ability of national 
regulators to confine private providers to the particular terms and conditions for use of NIPT 
that they (the regulators) might specify.
11
 National regulators might find that they are 
whistling in the wind. 
It was in this context that the Nuffield Council on Bioethics set up a Working Group (chaired 
by Professor Tom Shakespeare) ‘to consider the ethical, legal and regulatory implications of 
recent and potential future scientific developments in NIPT, with regard to its use in both 
NHS and commercial services, including for whole genome/exome sequencing’.12 Although 
the Working Group did not treat their remit as an invitation to review the current law on 
abortion, the relatively permissive legal framework for terminations is central to the context 
in which NIPT is being discussed. To be sure, some of the points for discussion concern the 
way in which the information yielded by NIPT might impact on women and future children; 
                                                          
7
  See (2015) 29:1 Bioethics (special issue on NIPT).  
 
8
  For example, Sequenom’s MaterniT 21 PLUS ‘can tell you if you are having a boy or a girl, and 
screens for both common and rare chromosomal abnormalities. The test screens for trisomy 21 (Down 
syndrome), trisomy 18 (Edwards syndrome), trisomy 13 (Patau syndrome), and many others that can 
affect your baby’s health’: see https://sequenom.com/tests/reproductive-health/maternit21-plus#patient-
overview (last accessed April 5, 2017). 
 
9
  See, e.g., K. Oswald, ‘Prenatal blood test detects cancer in mothers-to-be’, Bionews 739 (2015) at 
http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_503998.asp. (last accessed September 25, 2016).  
 
10
  Report (n 3), para 1.18 et seq. 
 
11
  Compare, e.g., the experience of the HFEA: see, Shaoni Bhattacharya, ‘HFEA to investigate claims of 
poor practice in UK fertility sector’ BioNews 899 (2017) at 
http://www.bionews.org.uk/page.asp?obj_id=839506&CView=188645#ULBM-839551 (last accessed 
February 24, 2018). 
 
12
  Report (n 3), Terms of reference, p. x. 
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but the core of the debate is about how such information might impact on the pattern of 
terminations. Indeed, if the law were less permissive, there might be less agitation about 
NIPT and less pressure to stake out a restrictive position.  
That said, even if we believe that the full range of the law relating to reproduction needs to be 
up for discussion, the Report is likely to be a point of reference in both the bioethical 
literature and in public debates about NIPT.
13
 
The Report 
In this part of the article, we will focus on: (i) the values that the Council presents as its 
ethical starting points; (ii) the application of the values to a range of ‘interested’ parties; (iii) 
three guiding principles that the Council specifies as a response to the perceived tensions in 
the ethical values and their application to NIPT; (iv) the Council’s recommendations as to the 
availability and use of NIPT; and, (v) the effective implementation of these 
recommendations. We will then undertake a short stock-taking. 
To avoid any misunderstanding, we should make it clear that, in this part of our discussion, 
we are not challenging the Council’s ethical axioms―we are not arguing that the Council has 
started in the wrong place. Rather, we are trying to clarify its starting points and then to trace 
out how they help us to engage with the central contested question: namely, which uses of 
NIPT―from testing simply to be informed through to testing as a precursor to a 
termination―should be treated as legitimate options? 
(i) The Council’s ethical starting points 
As we will explain later in the article, the Council does not subscribe to a particular bioethical 
view. For each report, an operative ethical framework is declared. However, this is not a case 
of the Council taking, say, a utilitarian approach in one report and then a Kantian or a 
communitarian approach in another. The Council simply does not relate to professional 
bioethics in this way. Rather, the ethical framework for each Report is a product of the views 
expressed by consultees together with the views formed by the particular Working Party. 
Accordingly, in the Report, which was preceded by extensive consultation, we read that the 
Council’s ‘ethical starting points’ are given by ‘the values of choice, autonomy and consent; 
avoidance of harm; and equality, inclusion and fairness.’14 We might hear echoes in this of 
Beauchamp and Childress’ principlism15 but no more than that: the ethics in this Report are 
bottom-up and bespoke. 
                                                          
13
  See, e.g., the motion put forward for debate by the Bishop of Carlisle at the Annual Meeting of the 
General Synod of the Church of England on February 10, 2018: available at 
https://www.churchofengland.org/sites/default/files/2018-01/GS%202078%20-
%20Agenda%20%28February%202018%29.pdf (last accessed February 10, 2018). 
 
14
  Report (n 3), para 1.55. 
 
15
  Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (7
th
 ed) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
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Choice, autonomy and consent 
It is not entirely clear how the Council understands each of ‘choice’, ‘autonomy’, and 
‘consent’ or the relationship between them. However, following the landmark decision of the 
UK Supreme Court in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board,
16
 few will dispute that, in 
reproductive settings, it is right to take seriously the autonomy of pregnant women, their 
choices, and their consent.
17
 In fact, after Montgomery, it is easy to argue that, in reproductive 
contexts, women should be aware of the clinical options that are available to them and be free 
to make their own choices. On the face of it, these considerations push in favour of making 
NIPT available to pregnant women. However, there is still much to clarify about autonomy, 
choice, and consent.
18
  
First, if a woman’s choice is to be treated as autonomous, it really must be her own choice. 
Although the idea of one person, A, making her own choice is incompatible with another 
person, B, making the choice for A (unless, of course, A’s choice is to authorise B so to act), 
or with B coercing A to make a particular choice, the web of relationships in which A finds 
herself might make it difficult to determine whether B, or other persons, are influencing A’s 
decision in a way that compromises it being her own choice. Such hard cases 
notwithstanding, the Council might want to argue that autonomous choice is valuable in and 
of itself, that there are clear cases where women are not making their own choices, and that it 
is right to do what we can to protect and restore autonomy (both on paper and in practice).
19
 
Secondly, if the necessary and sufficient conditions for A making an autonomous choice (in 
relation to some act) are that A chooses on a free and informed basis, then choices can be 
                                                          
16
  [2015] UKSC 11. See, e.g., R. Heywood, ‘R.I.P. Sidaway: Patient-Orientated Disclosure—A Standard 
Worth Waiting For?’ (2015) 23 Medical Law Review 455; and Roger Brownsword and Jeff Wale, ‘The 
Right to Know and the Right Not to Know Revisited’ (2017) 9 Asian Bioethics Review 3. 
 
17
  Although, if we take ‘a public health perspective’, matters might be much less straightforward: see 
Vardit Ravitsky, ‘The Shifting Landscape of Prenatal Testing: Between Reproductive Autonomy and 
Public Health’ (2017) 47 Hastings Center Report (Issue Supplement S3) S34-S40. According to 
Ravitsky, the debate about NIPT has been dominated by a reproductive autonomy rationale; but, there 
is also a largely unspoken public health rationale which is guided by the societal consequences of 
reproductive choices and the overall impact of individual decisions on the health of future populations. 
 
18
  See, e.g., Roger Brownsword. ‘Autonomy, Delegation, and Responsibility: Agents in Autonomic 
Computing Environments’ in Mireille Hildebrandt and Antoinette Rouvroy (eds), Autonomic 
Computing and Transformations of Human Agency (London: Routledge, 2011) 64 (for three 
conceptions of autonomy with different implications for the relevance of choice); and John Coggon and 
José Miola, ‘Autonomy, Liberty, and Medical Decision-Making’ (2011) CLJ 523 (particularly for the 
distinction between autonomy qua self-governance or making one’s own choices and liberty qua 
freedom to act without third-party interference or having a ‘real’ option).  
 
19
  Compare Emily Jackson and Shelley Day-Sclater, ‘Introduction: Autonomy and Private Life’ in 
Shelley Day-Sclater, Fatemeh Ebtehaj, Emily Jackson, and Martin Richards (eds), Regulating 
Autonomy: Sex, Reproduction and Family (Oxford: Hart, 2009) 1 at 2: ‘protecting autonomy may not 
only involve simply an absence of state interference, but could require the positive provision of 
resources to enable someone to have a meaningful set of options.’ 
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autonomous without having to be prudent, rational, reasonable, or moral.
20
 However, if we 
want to regulate the choices that are available to women―which the Council clearly 
does―then the focus of debate about NIPT is not so much on the autonomy of women but on 
the range of reproductive options that we judge to be permissible. It is the value of choice, or 
of particular choices, rather than the value of autonomy that is the ‘hot spot’ in this debate. 
Thirdly, if we have a background bioethical theory, what we make of consent―like what we 
make of autonomy and legitimate choices―will be shaped by that theory.21 Given, however, 
that the Council does not subscribe to any particular school of bioethics, this is just the kind 
of theory that it does not have. Nevertheless, following Montgomery, we can take it that, in 
clinical settings, a consent will not be adequate unless it satisfies conditions relating to 
freedom, information, capacity, and signalling.
22
 If we then transpose these conditions to our 
understanding of autonomous choice, we will agree with the Council that autonomous 
choices are predicated on having relevant information (which, in the case of NIPT, means 
having access to ‘accurate, balanced and non-directive information’23 about the test) as well 
as being free from improper pressure, duress, and the like.
24
  
Summing up, the triplet of choice/autonomy/consent is perhaps best read as supporting the 
interest of pregnant women in receiving appropriate information about NIPT, as well as the 
condition for which it is proposed that the test should be used, and then being left to make 
their own choice about whether or not to have the test. However, this is all subject to the 
proviso that the options involving the use of NIPT are legitimate. For the Council, 
autonomous choice might be valued but that is not to say that all choices are valued. 
Avoidance of harm 
While it is axiomatic that clinicians should ‘do no harm’,25 the import of the Council’s second 
starting point is far from self-evident. As the Council itself emphasised in one of its earlier 
and most reflective reports, 
                                                          
20
  We might recall Lord Donaldson’s famous remarks in Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649, at 652-653 (to the 
effect that adult patients, with capacity, have the absolute right to choose, meaning that this right is not 
limited to making choices that others would regard as sensible or rational). 
 
21
  For the way in which apparently ‘neutral’ terms such as ‘consent’ are coloured by the particular 
bioethical background theory that operates them, see Roger Brownsword, Rights, Regulation and the 
Technological Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
  
22
  See, Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Consent in the Law (Oxford: Hart, 2007). 
 
23
  Report (n 3), para 1.59. 
 
24
  Report (n 3), para 1.62. Coggon and Miola (n 18), referring to Al Hamwi v Johnston and Another 
[2005] EWHC 206, make the important point that the chooser also needs to have an adequate 
understanding of the information. 
 
25
  See, e.g., Sheila McLean (ed), First, Do No Harm (Festschrift for Ken Mason) (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2006). 
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the concepts of ‘benefit’, ‘harm’, ‘better’, ‘poorer’, etc are ambiguous and the nature 
and likelihoods of different outcomes arising from biotechnologies uncertain, and 
frequently contested.
26
 
Even if we set aside the notorious vagueness in the concept of harm,
27
 it is important to know 
relative to whom or relative to what the harm in question is to be avoided. 
The Council indicates that the avoidance of harm might mean ‘restricting access to NIPT in 
order to protect women from coming to harm’.28 However, it also contemplates that the harm 
to be avoided might relate to ‘others’ and that this ‘may mean limiting the freedom to access 
NIPT in some circumstances in order to protect the fetus, or to prevent harm to wider 
society.’29  If we link this back to the idea that it is right to leave women to make their own 
reproductive choices, provided that these are legitimate choices; and if we take it that choices 
that occasion harm to the woman making the choice, or to a fetus or to wider society are not 
legitimate; then we might wonder just how many options (on paper, let alone in practice
30
) 
will be left for women autonomously to choose. 
To the extent that the ‘avoidance of harm’ is designed to ensure that women make their own 
reproductive choices, there is no restriction on the choices that are available. However, if the 
‘avoidance of harm’ is designed to ensure that women (with capacity) avoid making choices 
that others judge to be contrary to their best interests, or that might be harmful to unborn or 
future human life, or that might be harmful to society, this invites a host of objections 
(including objections to paternalistic and illiberal restriction on the choices available)
31
 and 
difficult questions (concerning, for example, the moral status of the fetus,
32
 the status of 
                                                          
26
  Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Emerging biotechnologies: technology, choice and the public good 
(London, 2012), para 10.4(d). 
 
27
  Compare, e.g., Roger Brownsword, ‘Cloning, Zoning, and the Harm Principle’, in Sheila McLean (ed) 
(n 25) 527, and ‘A Simple Regulatory Principle for Performance-Enhancing Technologies: Too Good 
to be True?’, in Jan Tolleneer, Pieter Bonte, and Sigird Sterckx (eds) Athletic Enhancement, Human 
Nature and Ethics: Threats and Opportunities of Doping Technologies (Heidelberg: Springer, 2012) 
291. 
 
28
  Report (n 3), para 1.67. 
 
29
  Report (n 3), para 1.67. 
 
30
  See Roger Brownsword, ‘Law, Liberty and Technology’ in Roger Brownsword, Eloise Scotford, and 
Karen Yeung (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Law, Regulation and Technology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017) 41. 
 
31
  See, e.g., Stephen Wilkinson, Choosing Tomorrow’s Children (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010) at 11 
(on the standard Millian limiting principle).  
 
32
  A question to which, of course, there are several possible answers. See para 5.2 of the Report (n 3). 
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future generations, the causal link between individual choices and harmful impacts on wider 
society, and where the burden of justification lies).
33
  
To pause over just one objection, the avoidance of ‘harm to wider society’ could relate to 
many different kinds and degrees of harm to human interests. While it is one thing to restrict 
reproductive autonomy and choice in order to prevent catastrophic harm to the conditions for 
human existence, it is quite another to restrict it because this is the majority’s preference in a 
particular community. In due course, we will follow this up by suggesting that, unless some 
hierarchy is developed within the Council’s ethical starting points, the question of which 
reproductive options are legitimate will be left to a ‘balancing’ exercise that is more intuitive 
and pragmatic than principled.
34
   
Equality, fairness and inclusion 
Equality, like autonomy, can be conceived of in more than one way
35
 and, indeed, what one 
makes of the compatibility of equality with autonomy and choice depends very much on how 
one understands these concepts. Potentially, the Council’s third ethical starting point, like its 
second, bears in a restrictive way on the range of reproductive options that should be left 
available for the autonomous choice of women. 
In its introductory remarks, the Council says that equality starts with the idea that the State 
should respect ‘the equal value of all people’ and this is backed by the aspiration to cultivate 
‘a fair and inclusive society.’36 According to the Report, while the equality agenda has been 
taken forward in relation to gender (and reproductive choice) and the status of disabled 
people, it remains a cause for concern that ‘disabled people in the UK do not currently have 
access to the same opportunities as those without disabilities and continue to be discriminated 
against, excluded and marginalised.’37 The implication is that whatever equality (and other) 
arguments there might be in support of making NIPT available in the public health service, 
the State should do nothing to add to the existing failure to treat disabled people in a fair and 
fully inclusive way.
38
  
                                                          
33
  On this last point, compare John A. Robertson, Children of Choice: Freedom and the New 
Reproductive Technologies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994) (presumption in favour of 
procreative liberty, with the burden on opponents to demonstrate the harmful effects of some particular 
reproductive technique). 
 
34
  See, further, our discussion at pp xxx below. 
 
35
  See, e.g., John McMillan and Jeanne Snelling, ‘Equality: Old Debates, New Technologies’ in 
Brownsword et al (n 30) 69. 
 
36
  Report (n 3), paras 1.71-1.73. Even, it seems, to the point of including those who are merely potential 
future persons. 
 
37
  Report (n 3), para 1.77. 
 
38
  Compare Erik Parens and Adrienne Asch, ‘The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic Testing 
―Reflections and Recommendations’ (1999) 29 Hastings Center Report S1-S24; and Tom 
Shakespeare, Disability Rights and Wrongs (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006). 
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Pulling these threads together, these starting points suggest that, while it is right to let women 
make their own legitimate reproductive choices, such choices should not include the use of 
NIPT where this would be harmful to women, to the fetus or a future child, or to wider 
society, particularly by compromising the ideals of equality, fairness and inclusivity.   
(ii) The impact of NIPT on ‘interested’ parties 
As the Council rightly says, what we make of NIPT rather depends upon whose perspective 
we take—that of ‘pregnant women and couples, future people that fetuses might become, 
disabled people, [or] wider society.’39 For some, the impact of NIPT will be positive, but for 
others it will be negative. 
The most obvious beneficiaries of NIPT are pregnant women and couples, whose 
reproductive choices (and equality) promise to be enhanced. However, this is subject to the 
general proviso that the context supports the making of a free and informed choice (coupled 
with the choosing agent being able freely to act on their choice)―otherwise there might be 
more choice but not enhanced autonomous choice. It is important, for example, that the 
information given to pregnant women about NIPT is accurate and reliable (including whether 
or not the information yielded by the test itself is accurate and reliable); and the Council 
suggests, too, that reproductive autonomy might be compromised if the information given 
about the impact of genetic variations on disabled people and their families, as well as 
information about medical or societal attitudes towards disability, is inaccurate or unreliable.  
By contrast, while pregnant women might be harmed by NIPT―at any rate, if the context for 
free and informed choice is defective in some way, or if the test fails or proves to be 
inaccurate, unreliable, or inconclusive
40―the more obvious harm is to both the (terminated) 
fetus (unless one subscribes to the view that, at the relevant time, the fetus has no moral 
standing) and the (non-terminated) fetus-that-becomes-a-person (to some extent consequent 
on the loss of an ‘open future’41 and infringement of the right not to know but also arising 
from infringements of that person’s privacy). While disabled persons are not immediately and 
directly harmed by NIPT, they might suffer incremental and indirect harms, such as 
psychological harm arising from what they perceive as a negative valuation of them, less 
research into the genetic conditions that underlie the disabilities, and fewer services for (as 
well as discrimination against) a now reduced population of disabled persons. Furthermore, if 
the popular perception of disability changes in a way that leads to people being blamed for 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
39
  Report (n 3), para 5.3. 
 
40
  Report (n 3), para 5.10. 
 
41
  Report (n 3), para 5.6. Seminally, see Joel Feinberg, ‘The Child’s Right to an Open Future’ in Joel 
Feinberg (ed), Freedom and Fulfillment: Philosophical Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1992) 76. See, too, Wilkinson (n 31), at 47 (cautioning that talk of a child’s right to an open future ‘is 
not terribly helpful, both in general and a fortiori when discussing selective reproduction scenarios in 
which the putative rights bearers do not even exist yet’) and at 47-54 (for the way in which various 
concerns about the autonomy of a future child might be implicated in such talk).  
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having a baby with a disability, then this ‘might make disabled people and their families more 
vulnerable to discrimination, stigma or abuse.’42 
Finally—although the Council does not express it in quite these terms—there are perspectives 
that reflect one’s view of the kind of society to which one wants to belong.43 For example, 
one might think that it is unfair to expend scarce public health care resources in order to 
inform pregnant women about non-serious conditions or non-medical traits; or one might 
object to a change in what is considered to be a healthy pregnancy or a healthy child that is 
less inclusive; and, for similar reasons, one might oppose any movement towards eugenics.
44
 
Beyond such matters, the Council also notes a concern about NIPT being used to facilitate the 
birth of designer babies, such concern possibly reflecting a positive view of inclusion, but 
which might also be inspired by the kind of conservative dignitarian ethics that has been so 
opposed to the commodification or the commercialisation of life.
45
    
Given this plurality of perspectives, the key challenge for the Council is to articulate a 
concept of legitimate reproductive choice in a way that accommodates the interests of  
pregnant women and couples, the interests of the fetus-that-becomes-a-person, the interests of 
disabled persons, and the interests of wider society with its collective aspirations for equality, 
fairness and inclusion. 
(iii) Three guiding principles 
The Council suggests that policy-making should be guided by the following three 
principles
46
: 
Principle 1 (P1): The wider societal environment in which NIPT is provided and 
developed should be considered when developing policy relating to NIPT. 
 
Principle 2 (P2): Pregnant women and couples should have access, where 
appropriate, to NIPT within an environment that enables them to make 
autonomous, informed choices. 
 
                                                          
42
  Report (n 3), para 5.18. Compare Martin B. Delatycki, ‘The Ethics of Screening for Disease’ (2012) 
44(2) Pathology 63, at 65, where the author notes that ‘when a child is born with trisomy 21, parents 
have reported being questioned about why the diagnosis was not made during the pregnancy and steps 
take to prevent the birth of that child.’   
 
43
  See Parens and Asch (n 38). 
 
44
  Compare the cautionary remarks in Ravitsky (n 17); and, see Wilkinson (n 31) Ch 6. 
 
45
  See, e.g., Roger Brownsword, ‘Bioethics Today, Bioethics Tomorrow: Stem Cell Research and the 
“Dignitarian Alliance”’ (2003) 17 University of Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 
15. 
 
46
  Report (n 3), paras 5.24-5.37. 
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Principle 3 (P3): Efforts should be made to reduce any risks of significant harms 
posed by growing use and development of NIPT. 
While P2 is designed to promote an environment for the exercise of free and informed 
reproductive choices—including ensuring that ‘accurate, balanced and non-directive 
information is made available to women and couples in both the private and public 
sectors’47—P1 and P3 are intended to set limits on such choices. In P1, the ‘wider societal 
environment’ stands for the community’s aspiration that its members should be treated 
equally, fairly, and in an inclusive manner—an aspiration that, in part, militates against the 
use of NIPT ‘for less significant medical conditions and impairments, non-medical traits, and 
whole genome and exome sequencing;
48
 and, in P3, the ‘risks of significant harms’ relate to 
‘the autonomy, privacy, rights and other interests of future children and people, who should 
be able to make their own choices regarding information about their genetic makeup, to 
access the same opportunities and services as those who know nothing about their genetic 
makeup, and to live a life in which their future is open.’49  
Applying these principles, a compromise is brokered. On the one hand, autonomy and choice 
is privileged over inclusivity: for, even with some tilting of the informational environment in 
which choices about NIPT are being made, a woman might still decide to have NIPT and to 
act on its results by terminating her pregnancy. On the other hand, the avoidance of harm and 
the promotion of inclusivity are privileged over autonomy and choice: NIPT should not be 
used to test for conditions that are not significant (whether minor medical conditions or non-
medical traits) or where there is a risk of significant harm to a future person.  
However, the fundamental question remains: the compromise recognises only some choices 
as legitimate but in what sense is this really principled? 
(iv) The Council’s recommendations 
Broadly speaking, the Council’s overarching conclusions are as we might expect.50 They 
focus on three things: first, supporting the conditions that constitute the context for pregnant 
women to make autonomous reproductive choices with regard to the use of NIPT; secondly, 
supporting a social environment where disabled persons are valued as equals, and treated 
fairly and inclusively; and, thirdly, limiting access to and use of NIPT where the 
informational interests of pregnant women are relatively insignificant and are outweighed by 
the interests of future persons.  
Although it is recommended that the UK National Screening Committee should take ‘better 
consideration of the particular psychological, ethical and social consequences, some of which 
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  Report (n 3), para 5.31. 
 
48
  Report (n 3), para 5.28. 
 
49
  Report (n 3), para 5.37. 
 
50
  Report (n 3), p. 126. 
 
12 
 
will be unintended, of any prenatal screening programme where termination of pregnancy is 
an option’,51 the Council supports the piloting of NIPT within the national screening 
programme for Down syndrome. There is also a clutch of recommendations concerning NIPT 
in the private sector, including that the ‘Committee of Advertising Practice should more 
closely monitor the marketing activities of NIPT manufacturers and private hospitals and 
clinics to ensure that they are not misleading or harmful’; that NIPT providers should seek 
certification from recognised information quality schemes; and that private hospitals and 
clinics ‘should only offer NIPT as part of an inclusive package of care that should include, at 
a minimum, pre- and post-test counselling and follow-up invasive diagnostic testing if 
required.’52 
The Council, however, recommends two limits on the use of NIPT that invite further 
discussion: first, that NIPT should be offered only if it provides an accurate prediction of 
whether the fetus has or does not have the condition being tested for; and, second, that NIPT 
should ‘not normally’ be used to check ‘whether a fetus has a less significant medical 
condition or impairment or an adult onset condition; to find out whether the fetus is the 
carrier of a gene for any kind of medical condition or impairment; [or] to reveal non-medical 
traits of the fetus, including sex.’53  
Accuracy 
The first limiting recommendation discourages the return of findings that are difficult to 
interpret or that cannot be acted on with any confidence. While the Council is not alone in 
thinking that such findings should not be returned, it is not clear how this view sits with the 
value of reproductive autonomy or a pregnant woman’s right to know. In support of a 
restriction relating to the return of such findings, the following three justifications might be 
offered. 
First, it might be said that findings that are not reliable, accurate, interpretable and actionable 
are not worth having. To strike such findings from the list of NIPT options makes no 
difference to a pregnant woman’s autonomy and the choices that are not available are not 
worth having. This, however, ignores the wishes of women who want to know simply for the 
sake of knowing
54
 or who want to bank the results pending a time when they are more 
interpretable and actionable (albeit not during their current pregnancy). 
Secondly, the argument might be that women might be harmed by irresponsible providers 
who are willing, without giving fair warning, to return inaccurate or non-interpretable, or 
non-actionable results, possibly leading to some psychological anxiety and economic loss. 
                                                          
51
  Report (n 3), para 6.33. 
 
52
  Report (n 3), p. 126. 
 
53
  Ibid. The Council also concludes that NIPT should not normally be used for whole genome or exome 
sequencing of fetuses except in a research environment. 
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  See, Z. Deans, A.J. Clarke, and A.J. Newson, ‘For your interest? The ethical acceptability of using non-
invasive prenatal testing to test “purely for information”’ (2014) 29 Bioethics 19. 
13 
 
Such a consumer protection justification for the restriction might be supplemented by 
concerns about possible consequential costs to publicly-funded health care. 
Thirdly, the second argument might be extended to focus on possible harm to the fetus that 
becomes a future person. However, those who argue for a robust right to know might wonder 
why a (current) woman’s informational interests should have to yield for the sake of the 
informational interests of (i) a fetus that might or might not become a future person and (ii) 
when the results of the test might or might not be ones that, in future, can be relied on.   
Although there is some intuitive appeal in the proposition that inaccurate findings should not 
be returned, the question is whether the option to use NIPT knowing that the results might not 
be accurate and reliable is a legitimate one. Saying that the results will not be useful is hardly 
compelling; saying that the results might be harmful to the woman is paternalistic; and saying 
that the results might harm a fetus that might or might not become a future person invites 
further analysis and debate. 
The type of condition 
There is much that might be said in relation to the second limiting recommendation but we 
will make just four points. 
First, the recommendation presupposes that the results obtained by NIPT are likely to be used 
to inform a woman’s choice about the continuation or termination of her pregnancy. While 
this is not an unreasonable assumption, it presents a danger of losing sight of the question of 
whether it is legitimate to know simply for its own sake or for the sake of forward planning 
(but not termination).
55
 For example, in those communities where there is pre-conception 
genetic testing  of teenage children (to inform the latter about their carrier status),
56
 a 
pregnant woman’s use of NIPT to check for carrier status in her child might be viewed as a 
perfectly legitimate option. Similarly, although late onset conditions can present hard cases 
for any bioethicist,
57
 it is one thing to want to be aware that a future person has the markers 
for such a condition and quite another to want to know (as was the case with the claimant in 
ABC v St George's Healthcare NHS Trust & Ors
58
) as a precursor to a possible termination.    
                                                          
55
  See Deans et al (n 54). 
 
56
  See Human Genetics Commission, Increasing options, informing choice: A report on preconception 
genetic testing and screening (London, April 2011). 
 
57
  Compare Deryck Beyleveld, Oliver Quarrell and Stuart Toddington, ‘Generic Consistency in the 
Reproductive Enterprise: Ethical and Legal Implications of Exclusion Testing for Huntington’s 
Disease’ (1998) 3 Medical Law International 135. 
 
58
  [2015] EWHC 1394 (QB), [2017] EWCA Civ 336. In the ABC case, the claimant, who was 
pregnant at the relevant time, sued the defendants, complaining that they had failed to inform her that 
her father had been diagnosed with Huntington’s Disease. Had the claimant been so informed, she 
would have known that she was at risk of having the disease and, knowing that her child would also be 
at risk, she would have terminated the pregnancy. In the High Court, the claim was struck out on the 
ground that, because the defendants obtained the information about the father’s health status in 
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Secondly, there is a sense that the proposed restrictions are made in the shadow of the 
existing law on abortion. Not only does this shadow obscure the question of whether a 
woman may legitimately want to know simply for its own sake, but also the Report brackets 
off the legitimacy of the law (and whatever shadow it casts). So, for example, when it is 
recommended that NIPT providers should be prohibited from generating or reporting 
information about the sex of the fetus unless ‘there is concern that the fetus may be showing 
signs of a significant sex chromosome aneuploidy or is at risk of a sex-linked disorder’59, 
NIPT is being viewed as a precursor to a termination (rather than information pure and 
simple about the sex of the child) and questions about what the law on social sex selection 
actually is and what it ought to be are off the table.
60
    
Thirdly, the distinction between significant and less significant medical conditions is central 
to the recommendation. No doubt, there will be plenty of questions about how to draw this 
distinction, including whether a significant condition is the same as a ‘serious’ condition or a 
‘severely disabling’ condition. However, there is once again a danger of losing sight of the 
distinction between a woman simply wanting to know and her wanting to know in order to 
decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. Arguably, a woman has a right to use NIPT to 
detect conditions such as CF or, say, hypertrophic cardiomyopathy
61
 regardless of whether 
they are characterised as significant or less significant medical conditions. Whether or not 
NIPT should be used to test for such conditions as a precursor to a decision about continuing 
or terminating a pregnancy is another matter. 
Fourthly, if we are to make an adequate assessment of the recommendation, we need to be 
critically aware not only of the law on abortion but of the full spectrum of the regulatory 
environment relating to reproductive information and choice. From PGD to NIPT, there 
needs to be a narrative that both explains and justifies who can be tested for what, how and 
by whom the test is to be administered, what information is to be returned, and who pays for 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
confidence, and because the father was emphatic that he did not want his daughter to be told, it would 
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  Report (n 3), para 6.16. 
 
60
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What it says, and why (Stratford-upon-Avon: BPAS, May 2013) 19, available at 
http://www.reproductivereview.org/images/uploads/Britains_abortion_law.pdf (last accessed February 
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testing in England & Wales’ (2015) 15(4) Medical Law International 203, 211.  
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August 2, 2017 ( available at https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/aug/02/deadly-gene-
mutations-removed-from-human-embryos-in-landmark-study) (last accessed August 3, 2017). 
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all of this.
62
 In short, the regulatory environment should be coherent.
63
 However, this is no 
easy matter. Once we set the proposed restrictions on NIPT in this larger regulatory context, 
we soon meet the more general questions about the kind of community that we want to be 
that we will introduce later in the article.   
(v) Effectiveness 
In a world designed for regulatory effectiveness, regulators would know exactly what they 
planned to achieve, they would commit sufficient resources to all phases of the regulatory 
cycle, there would be no attempt by regulatees to corrupt or capture regulators, there would 
be no resistance by regulatees, and there would be no external interference. Needless to say, 
this is not our world, and it is certainly not the world in which the State might act on the 
Council’s recommendations. 
Insofar as it is accepted that NIPT should be offered subject to the Council’s recommended 
terms and conditions, there would seem to be better prospects for effective implementation in 
the public sector than in relation to private sector provision. Even then, we should not assume 
that there will not be resistance to limited availability and use within the NHS. Already, for 
example, the UK National Screening Committee (UKNSC) has experienced significant 
resistance to its unwillingness to introduce routine screening for group B Streptococcus in 
pregnancy and, concomitantly, to make more use of antibiotics.
64
 If, following its piloting of 
NIPT, the UKNSC adopts a restrictive policy to which there is significant opposition, it might 
find that its experience with the group B Strep community is repeated with a new lobbying 
group for NIPT.  
However, with regard to the private sector provision of NIPT, there are additional factors that 
militate against effective implementation of the Council’s recommendations. Most 
importantly, many private providers will have an online presence. As the Council 
acknowledges, any attempt to restrict access to NIPT in order to determine the sex of a fetus 
might be ineffective ‘given the possibility of accessing NIPT services in other countries or 
via the internet’.65  It seems that, while we might endlessly debate the rights and wrongs of 
particular uses of NIPT, we should lower our expectations about the effective implementation 
                                                          
62
  Nb the seminal critique of the regulatory environment for reproduction in Emily Jackson, ‘Conception 
and the Irrelevance of the Welfare Principle’ (2002) 65 MLR 176; and for some important cautions 
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OJLS 153. 
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of any policy that impinges on the reproductive choices that pregnant women—or, at any 
rate, pregnant women with sufficient resources—might want to have.  
Significantly, there is already evidence—confirmed by the Council’s own review66—that 
online information about NIPT falls short of what is required for the proper exercise of 
reproductive autonomy. For instance, there is evidence that commercial test providers are 
pitching their online communications above the recommended reading age for public health 
information’,67 and that some commercial web advertising may contain inadequate or 
outdated information
68
 (the latter being a particular risk when technology advances so 
quickly). Whilst the threat of deliberate miss-selling or fraud might be unlikely, it is no 
surprise that commercial test providers tend to emphasise the benefits rather than the 
limitations of the technology in their marketing material.
69
 Links to peer reviewed citations 
are not always present and this can make it difficult to evaluate the nature and currency of the 
claims made.
70
 Further, private test providers do not always mention the specific 
abnormalities that can reliably be detected through conventional trimester screening,
71
 or the 
differentials in failure rates between different testing technologies.
72
   
That said, although there are challenges to effective implementation, the position is not 
completely hopeless.
73
 After all, NIPT cannot be undertaken without blood being drawn and 
it might be possible to exert some domestic control over professional health care workers 
drawing samples for this purpose.
74
  This apart, if regulators in the UK are to exert some 
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control over online provision of NIPT by providers who are based outside the jurisdiction, 
they need to have some leverage over the provider’s assets or personnel or reputation within 
the UK (recall how, in LICRA v Yahoo!,
75
 the Paris court managed to exert some influence 
over Yahoo!); or they need to persuade internet service providers, or other online 
intermediaries, to act as ‘chokepoints’, restricting supply of goods, services, or information 
from target sites;
76
 or, there might be opportunities for various kinds of reciprocal cross-
border enforcement or other forms of cooperation between national regulators
77—for 
example, there might be opportunities to develop co-operative global state engagement by 
agreeing guidelines in relation to the leading issues.
78
  
Perhaps more controversially, if private provision creates an unacceptable regulatory risk, 
publicly funded NIPT might be mooted. Potentially this would squeeze the private sector 
(even without formal abolition) although the extent of the squeeze would depend on the 
degree of service equivalence. Given that such an initiative would have significant resource 
implications,
79
 a more realistic solution might be some form of public/private partnership that 
utilises the Council’s proposed system of licensing, certification and professional body 
regulation/guidance.
80
 The challenge for the State is to determine how far the informational 
interests of pregnant women are to be recognised and supported,
81
 and then to decide on the 
allocation of costs between the public and private sectors while maintaining a coherent public 
narrative and regulatory environment.
82
  
(vi) Taking stock 
NIPT is new and it merits the kind of ethical attention that it is given by the Council. 
Nevertheless, seasoned commentators might view the Report as a continuation of old 
debates―for example, debates about the tension between reproductive autonomy and the 
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interests of the disabled
83
, or between individual autonomy and the common good,
84
 and so 
on. After all, it was some years ago that John Robertson wrote: 
[S]ociety must decide whether to permit these [new reproductive] techniques to be 
developed and used. It must identify the circumstances in which use should be 
restricted or regulated, and devise a framework for respecting individual desires for 
access while maintaining ethical values, protecting offspring and participants, and 
preventing injustice and oppression in their use. This is no small task. The deepest 
needs of individuals must be reconciled with community values in a setting where the 
rules are still unwritten and subject to change.
85
 
In other words, it might be said that the Report adds little to bioethics, recycling familiar 
arguments and taking a position that represents a relatively conservative compromise 
between principles and interests that are opposed.  
Is this a fair comment? Certainly, one of the striking features of the Report is the double 
ethical push-back against NIPT. First, in support of the making of autonomous choices, the 
Report recommends that information about the limits of NIPT and about the actualities of 
disability should be given; and, secondly, the Report recommends that women’s choices to 
use NIPT should be restricted except where the trisomies or other significant medical 
conditions are the target. This is a relatively conservative position and it will disappoint those 
who take a more liberal view. However, what is really missing from the Report is any 
compelling reason for taking such a position. Neither the ethical starting points nor the three 
guiding principles can do all the work in justifying this position. They can present the 
arguments, the tensions and the options; but they cannot of themselves determine how the 
balance of interests should be struck; they cannot tell us why, at the key points of opposition, 
one interest has more weight than another.  
It might also be said that, even if the Council gave compelling ethical arguments for its 
conservative position, in practice, the use of NIPT will not be so limited. That might or might 
not prove correct. However, we can scarcely lay this kind of responsibility at the door of the 
Council. For ethics councils, just as for regulators and lawmakers, there are no guarantees 
that the standards that are proposed and adopted are actually effective. 
Two General Questions: Informational Interests and Genetic Characteristics 
Whatever we make of the Council’s particular recommendations about the use of NIPT, we 
should not lose sight of the bigger picture. For, the Report implicates more general questions 
about the kind of society we want to be. Moreover, it does so at a moment of intense 
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technological disruption
86
, when we find ourselves living in ‘information societies’ but 
without a settled sense of the ‘informational interests’87 that we should recognise. At the 
same time, we inhabit ‘genetic societies’—this, as the Chief Medical Officer has put it, is the 
era of ‘Generation Genome’88—but without having a settled sense of how genetics fits with 
our traditional values. While some of our questions about genetics are informational 
questions, most vividly captured in our attempts to stabilise and ground the claimed rights to 
know and not to know
89—or, as in the ABC case, establishing the circumstances in which 
A’s duty to respect the confidentiality of medical information obtained from B may 
legitimately be overridden in order to prevent harm to C
90—others are of a quite different 
order, concerning who we are and what we might be. From a potentially long agenda for 
discussion, we can speak briefly to the question of informational interests and then to the 
bearing of genetic testing and selection on reproductive policies that aspire to treat all humans 
equally, fairly and inclusively. 
Our informational interests 
For some time, it has been clear that our twentieth-century understanding of our 
informational interests needs to be reassessed.
91
 That understanding, developed in the context 
of a certain state of technological development
92
, centres on our interest in treating some 
information as private (as no one’s business other than our own) and our having control over 
the circulation of such information (if and when it is disclosed). However, this interest in 
individual restriction and control now comes into tension with the general benefits that are to 
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be obtained if only information might flow more freely. So, for example, in a recent 
contribution to the Chief Medical Officer’s Annual Report, we read: 
The success of genomic medicine will depend on patients having confidence that the 
way genomic information is generated, held and used will properly protect their 
interests. This requires re-examining the traditional rules around confidentiality, 
which focused on secrecy and the keeping of information as separate and private.
93
  
Moving into the present century, however, the main disruptions to privacy and confidentiality 
were presented, not by genomics, but by the IT infrastructures that support not only health 
care research but also vast swathes of commerce. While the requirement that the processing 
of personal data (in these new IT environments) should be fair and lawful, purpose-specific, 
and proportionate, might sound reasonable enough, there are huge problems in applying this 
standard in contexts that are as different as health care research and popular entertainment. 
With the recent developments in machine learning and AI, there are further pressures: it is 
one thing to turn a blind eye to the lack of proper notice and consent with regard to the 
collection and processing of data that enables recommender systems to profile consumers, 
quite another to do so when the Royal Free London NHS Foundation Trust agrees with 
Google DeepMind to transfer more than a million patient records to the latter in order to 
facilitate the development of a clinical alert app for acute kidney injury.
94
  
Beyond rethinking which informational interests should be recognised, there is a need to rank 
the importance of particular interests relative to not only non-informational interests but also 
inter se. For example, if the ABC case
95
 does go to trial, the judge will have to determine 
whether the claimant’s interest in accessing information about her father’s medical condition 
prevails against the defendant’s responsibility to respect the confidentiality of the information 
at issue. The case for prioritising the claimant’s interest is not that the information will 
advance the collective interest in health care research. This is a case about reproductive 
autonomy and the traditional value of confidentiality. Whichever way we frame it, this is a 
tough call for any judge and, equally, a tough call for any community. 
Currently, we strive to specify our informational rights by asking whether it is a ‘reasonable 
expectation’ that the particular benefit or protection that we claim should be enjoyed, 
employing various reference points (in the positive law, in practice, in inter-personal signals, 
in accepted concepts and values, and so on) to determine whether or not an expectation is 
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‘reasonable’.96 However, to recall one of our earlier remarks (in connection with the idea of 
harm to the wider society), an expectation might be reasonable because it relates to: (i) the 
preservation or protection of the preconditions for human existence or the essential context 
for any form of human social existence; or (ii) respect for the values that are fundamental to, 
and constitutive of, a particular form of human social existence;
97
 or (iii) a plausible 
balancing of the conflicting, but legitimate, interests and preferences of different members of 
the community. To deny an expectation that relates to (i) would be unreasonable and 
irrational; to deny an expectation that relates to (ii) would be unreasonable unless an 
equivalent competing expectation can be advanced; and to contest an expectation that relates 
to (iii) is to engage in the everyday negotiation of legitimate but conflicting interests. In other 
words, we need to differentiate explicitly and systematically between expectations that are 
reasonable relative to the essential pre-conditions for any human social existence and 
expectations that are reasonable relative to positions and practices that already presuppose 
that these conditions are secured;
98
 and we need to differentiate between expectations that 
draw on the values that make our particular community the distinctive community that it is 
and expectations that are argued for as reasonable in the routine processes of accommodating 
a plurality of interests.  
So, the first step is to consider whether there are any informational interests that are 
implicated in the essential preconditions for any kind of human social existence. Arguably, 
there are. In particular, if we accept that, as prospective agents, humans need an environment 
in which they are able to exercise these distinctive capacities, this implies a context in which 
humans are able, inter alia, to freely choose their own purposes, plans, and projects (‘to do 
their own thing’) and to form a sense of their own identity (‘to be their own person’). The 
potential implication of informational interests is nicely expressed in a recent paper from the 
Royal Society and British Academy where, in a discussion of data governance and privacy, 
we read that: 
Future concerns will likely relate to the freedom and capacity to create conditions in 
which we can flourish as individuals; governance will determine the social, political, 
legal and moral infrastructure that gives each person a sphere of protection through 
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which they can explore who they are, with whom they want to relate and how they 
want to understand themselves, free from intrusion or limitation of choice.
99
 
In this light, we can understand not only why there is such a profound concern about 
intensive surveillance—whether George Orwell’s 1984100, the Chinese social credit 
system,
101
 or today’s dataveillance practices102—but also about the informational restriction 
of an agent’s open future. Quite simply, the concern is profound because it goes to the 
integrity of the critical infrastructure on which human social existence is itself predicated.
103
 
Having worked out which informational interests need to be recognised and protected as part 
of the infrastructure for any human community, the debate can move on to consider which, if 
any, informational interests are to be privileged in our particular community, Here, bioethics 
becomes more local and potentially pluralistic; the values recognised as fundamental and 
constitutive by one community might differ from those of another (but, of course, all 
communities presuppose the same critical infrastructural conditions). Finally, we get to those 
legitimate interests and preferences that neither touch and concern the critical infrastructure 
for all human social communities nor the fundamental values of the particular community. 
Here, bioethics necessarily has to focus on facilitating acceptable compromise and 
accommodation rather than reminding communities of the preconditions and context for any 
purposeful activity or recalling the fundamental values to which the particular community has 
committed itself. None of this means that, in practice, communities will quickly agree on 
their scheme of informational interests but at least there will be some clarity about which 
questions should be asked and why one interest might be treated as more important than 
another.  
Our genetic characteristics 
How should the genomic generation square its new insights into human disease and, possibly, 
human behaviour with its approach, on the one hand, to human reproduction and, on the 
other, to disability, capability and enhancement?
104
 Two strands in the Report span and 
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connect these matters. One is the importance attached to the future person having an open 
future and the other is the aspiration towards an equal, fair and inclusive society.
105
  
In the light of our preceding remarks, it will be understood that the preconditions for the self-
development of agents include leaving a person to make their own life choices. One aspect of 
this is leaving it to the person to decide how much or how little they themselves wish to know 
about their genetic pedigree or profile (quite apart from having a view about whether such 
information should be recorded and stored or available to others); and, another is leaving it to 
the person to develop their own talents and tastes. If the reproductive process involves 
gathering genetic information about the fetus-that-is-to-become-a-person—and it is arguable 
that we have special (heightened) responsibilities to such a fetus, responsibilities that are 
quite distinct from whatever rights women might have to terminate or to continue with a 
pregnancy—then there is a concern that the context for the latter’s self-development might be 
compromised. Similarly, if the reproductive process involves careful selection of genetic 
features that are associated with particular skills and talents, then there is a concern that the 
‘enhancement’ of the fetus will once again compromise the conditions for its subsequent self-
development. As Henry Greely has suggested, it might not be too many decades before 
reproduction takes place in highly controlled conditions.
106
 If so, society will need to decide a 
cascade of questions about how it wishes to reproduce and what kind of human it wishes to 
reproduce.
107
 
Open futures, however, are not the Council’s only concern. Quite rightly, the Council argues 
that new reproductive technologies should be applied in ways that are consistent with the 
aspiration for equality, fairness and inclusiveness.
108
 At one level, that of the essential 
preconditions for human social existence, we are all in the same position. We all have an 
equal need for these conditions. However, at another level, once the preconditions are in 
place, we begin to contest our understanding of what is equal and fair and how far inclusivity 
should go. At this level, there will be a plurality of views and each community will have its 
own vision of an equal, fair and inclusive society. In some communities, it might be accepted 
that there is nothing unfair about permitting enhancement of an agent’s generic capacities; 
but, in others, where access to the relevant technologies is not equally enjoyed, such 
enhancement might be prohibited. However, even if the community’s aspirations for equality 
and fairness are satisfied, how does enhancement stand with its aspiration for inclusivity? 
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One view is that it is not contradictory to treat enhancement as permissible or to adopt 
measures to reduce or even eliminate disabling genetic conditions while, at the same time, 
maintaining that those who are not enhanced or those born humans who are disabled should 
be fully respected.
109
 Whatever any particular community makes of this view, it already hints 
at perhaps the most disruptive effect of new technologies, namely to encourage a shift from 
ex post response (to crime, to illness, to accidents, and so on) to ex ante prevention. In the 
emergent technocratic mind-set the dominant thought is this: if we have the technology to 
manage a particular risk, why not use it? Over time, technological management might 
displace humans from the workplace, even laws as we know them,
110
 and in reproductive 
contexts it might deselect those embryos and fetuses that do not conform to the approved 
standard of quality and fitness, or that are viewed as unacceptable risks. It might seem like a 
very long way from NIPT to autonomous vehicles and to predictive policing, but the 
direction of travel towards prevention and preclusion is unmistakeable.
111
 
Neither the Council in its Report, nor we in this article, can resolve these important questions. 
These are matters that touch and concern not only the essential conditions for any viable 
human community but also the distinctive commitments of each particular society. Just as 
each human must determine what kind of person they aspire to be, it is for each community 
of humans to debate and determine what kind of society they collectively aspire to be. This a 
challenge that should be neither underrated nor ignored―the debate about NIPT is, so to 
speak, merely the tip of an iceberg.  
The Role of the Council 
For a quarter of a century, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics has played a key role in 
informing the public about new developments in science and medicine (particularly new 
developments in human genetics), in highlighting the ethical and regulatory issues to which 
these developments give rise, and in encouraging rational debate and deliberation about a 
range of emerging biotechnologies. In a world where trust is at a premium, the Council 
rightly enjoys an enviable reputation for its independence and its integrity.  
Nevertheless, questions have been raised about whether the way that the Council traditionally 
operates is fully fit for purpose—witness, first, the Firetail evaluation of the Council112 and, 
secondly, the setting up of a new Governing Board, sitting between the Council and the 
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Funders
113, which is tasked with reviewing the Council’s ‘work, remit and delivery.’114 In this 
context, we can highlight two major challenges for the Council, one intellectual, the other 
political. 
The intellectual challenge centres on the Council’s general adherence to what Harald Schmidt 
and Jason Schwartz term a ‘flexible-focus’—as opposed to a ‘rigid-grid’—approach.115 In 
contrast with the latter, the ‘flexible-focus’ approach ‘does not impose ethical principles or 
norms in a top-down fashion, but identifies them anew for each topic or report.’116 
Underlying this approach is the Council’s commitment to inclusiveness (no single view or 
approach to bioethics should be favoured, and the expression of all views should be 
encouraged), to rationality (all arguments should be capable of being heard but should be 
submitted to tests of coherence and rationality) and to rigour (the work of the Council should 
be based on the best evidence available, and supported by careful and comprehensive 
analysis).
117
 The rationality and rigour, however, are engaged only after a range of voices has 
been inclusively heard.  
In the case of the Report on NIPT, the Working Group starts with a set of values which are 
then systematised by the three guiding Principles. Given its ‘flexible-focus’ approach, the 
Council is under no pressure to start from rights or utility rather than duty, or to major on the 
idea of solidarity,
118
 or vulnerability, or human dignity, or genetic identity (which is 
discussed in the mitochondrial DNA report)
119
 or stewardship (which features prominently in 
both the report on public health
120
 and the recent report on cosmetic procedures
121
), or to 
cross-refer to the ethics laid out in the contemporaneous report on gene editing.
122
 Taking its 
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particular approach, the Council, as Schmidt and Schwartz put it, assumes ‘more the role of 
an editor or publisher, leaving the question of the extent to which deeper normative issues 
need to be addressed to the initiative of the working group.’123 
Put starkly, the question is whether the Council can take its commitment to rationality any 
deeper and whether, at the same time, it can develop a greater coherence and consistency 
across the body of its work. Without such depth, coherence, and consistency, sceptics might 
wonder why we should take the Council’s bioethical contributions seriously. Moreover, the 
Council is liable to find itself on the back foot in engaging with those scientists and 
technologists who think that their sphere of hard facts is where we find the terra firma of 
rationality. To be sure, the Council adds gravitas and some structure to bioethics, sharpening 
and organising the views of its consultees; but, so the criticism might go, it looks like one set 
of opinions is mediated by the working groups before being endorsed by the Council. 
Relating this to the balancing of competing interests which is central to the Report on NIPT, 
there is a problem, as we have said, about advocating a particular balance without offering a 
view about the ranking and weight of particular interests. If the Council could articulate a 
defensible tiered scheme of interests, it would have reason to push hard for its views; but, 
without that kind of rational underpinning, arguably, it should stick to presenting the options. 
This leads to the other challenge which is more political in nature. At a time of major 
developments in the life sciences and their associated technologies, there are important 
conversations for each community to have. However, there is more than one way in which 
the Council might relate to these conversations. For example, the Council might follow its 
own advice in its report on emerging biotechnologies
124
 when, in the context of developing a 
public discourse ethics (oriented to the public good), it recommended that 
expert deliberation and public engagement exercises should report their conclusions 
not in the form of simple prescriptive findings but as a properly qualified ‘plural and 
conditional’ advice.125 
Taking this approach, the Council would see ‘the public’ as its principal audience; where 
recommendations are made, they would be presented as starting points for public debate—at 
most as a candidate common position in our pluralistic democracy; and, the impact of the 
Council’s reports would be measured, not so much by their translation into government 
policy, but by their contribution to the quality, reflectiveness, and rationality of public debate 
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and deliberative democratic decision-making.  Alternatively, the Council might see itself as 
more of a player in policy circles than as a facilitator of public debate. Taking this approach, 
the Council would target key policymakers as its audience; its reports and recommendations 
would be sharpened to serve as scripts ready for immediate adoption by policymakers;
126
 and, 
the measure of its impact would be whether its views were reflected in government policy 
and practice. 
For our own part, we favour the former model. Unlike many other countries, the United 
Kingdom does not have a national bioethics council and, at a time of unprecedented 
technological disruption, the Council’s non-partisan facilitation of reflection on the public 
good would be more valuable than ever. However, the viability of this model is subject to a 
number of conditions: one is that this is actually the vision that the funders have for the 
Council; a second is that the new governance arrangements do not compromise the possibility 
of the Council acting as independent facilitators; and a third is that the Council resists the 
temptation to demonstrate ‘impact’ by closing down options that need to be kept open or by 
advocating too hard for recommendations that are clearly contestable (whether because they 
are not evidence-based
127
 or because, normatively, they are not sufficiently robust).
128
 
In a world where emerging technologies are disruptive in both positive and negative ways
129
, 
the Council has made a significant contribution to public deliberation and to helping 
communities to focus on doing the right thing (emphasising that the fact that ‘we can do x’ 
does not entail that ‘we should do x’). If the process of renewal helps the Council to do this 
better, then that is all to the good; but, if the renewal signals a change of direction for the 
Council, then we should reserve judgment until we know precisely what role it is playing. 
Concluding remarks 
In this article, we have reviewed the Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ Report on NIPT, 
particularly the ethical framework that is developed to guide the Council’s recommendations 
on the legitimate use of NIPT; we have begun to sketch the bigger picture implicated by the 
Report, introducing two general questions arising therefrom, each of which speaks to the kind 
of community that we distinctively want to be; and we have offered some short reflections on 
the renewal of the Council itself and the role that it might play in society.  
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Our view of the Report is that the ethical framework does not, and cannot without more, 
justify taking a particular position where the relevant considerations are in tension. The 
Council takes a relatively conservative view but it would face precisely the same problem if it 
had taken a more liberal view. So long as the question of the legitimate use of NIPT is framed 
in terms of finding a balance between various competing interests, there is no compelling 
reason for striking one balance rather than another. Without some sense of the relative 
importance of the various interests, there are just too many apparently ‘reasonable’ or ‘not 
unreasonable’ positions to be struck. In our remarks on the bigger picture, we have given 
some indication of how we might approach the importance of different human interests so 
that we can identify some positions as categorically unreasonable, others as inconsistent with 
a community’s fundamental values, and others as within the range of reasonableness. If, 
following its renewal, the Council could help the community to engage with new 
technologies against this kind of backcloth of human needs and interests, it would play an 
even more important role in stimulating and guiding public deliberation. Failing this, the 
Council should be slow to make hard recommendations but, instead, should focus on 
facilitating public engagement by making clear that there are a number of options to be 
considered and then choices to be made. 
As things stand, we find ourselves in a period of transition, of ‘inbetween-ness’, and of 
uncertainty―indeed, in a period of ‘liminality’ of just the kind that is being researched by 
Graeme Laurie and his team at Edinburgh.
130
 First, it remains to be seen whether the 
conservative recommendations in the Report will be acted on and will actually hold the line. 
Secondly, there are already new research findings about the accuracy of NIPT
131
 and 
questions being raised about how best to offer the test.
132
 Thirdly, the ‘piloting’ of NIPT 
within the NHS Fetal Anomaly Screening Programme, leaves its status somewhere between 
‘research’ and ‘implementation.’ Fourthly, while public health providers make up their minds 
about NIPT, private provision of the test is subject only to the usual market rules. Fifthly, 
NIPT finds itself caught between a public health paradigm (with a mission for collective 
health and well-being) and a paradigm of reproductive autonomy and patient-centred health 
care (with a prospectus for individual rights).
133
 Sixthly, with some now making an ambitious 
call for ‘a broad renegotiation of the social contract for medical research and medical practice 
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in the NHS’,134  there is an opening for engagement with the more general questions that we 
have identified. Last but not least, the NCOB itself is in transition and there is a questionmark 
about its future role. On all fronts, we conclude that there are testing times ahead. 
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